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Sammendrag 
Strukturelle arbeidstilbudsmodeller representerer viktige verktøy for å kunne beskrive individuelle 
beslutninger i arbeidsmarkedet. Slike modeller kan for eksempel anvendes til å beskrive 
fordelingseffekter av skatteendringer. Effekter av skatteendringer kan måles ved hjelp av pengemål på 
nytteendringene, som ekvivalent variasjon og kompensert variasjon. Sammenliknet med disponibel 
inntekt, som en ofte anvender i fordelingsanalyser av endringer i skattepolitikken, måler ekvivalent 
variasjon og kompensert variasjon effekter på individenes totale nytte. Det betyr at det tas hensyn til 
både endringer i forbruk og arbeidstilbud i målingen av effekter av skatteendringer. I dette arbeidet 
argumenteres det for at arebidstilbudsmodellen LOTTE-Arbeid (utviklet i SSB) er spesielt anvendbar 
til slike empiriske analyser fordi den, sammenliknet med standard arbeidstilbudsmodeller, gir en mer 
omfattende beskrivelse av individenes valg. I LOTTE-Arbeid modelleres individenes valg når det tas 
hensyn til at det er individuell variasjon i mulighetene på arbeidsmarkedet. Aktørene står overfor ulike 
muligheter på arbeidsmarkedet fordi det er forskjeller mellom individene i hvor mange jobber de 
tilbys. Siden det er økt fokus i litteraturen på velferdsmålinger der det skilles mellom valg som skyldes 
individenes preferanser og effekter av restriksjoner utenfor individenes kontroll, hevdes det at 
LOTTE-Arbeid er en modell som svarer på denne utfordringen. Det betyr at en i vurderingen av 
fordelingseffekter av skatteendringer kan skille mellom hva som primært tilhører individets eget 
ansvar, preferanser, og hva som skyldes ulikheter i rammebetingelser, som forskjeller i muligheter på 
arbeidsmarkedet. I dette arbeidet vises det hvordan LOTTE-Arbeid kan anvendes til å beskrive 




The static structural labour supply model, with consumption and leisure as arguments in the utility 
function, represents a key source of information for predictions of the effects of tax policy change in 
the short-run, so-called “day after” effects. Models belonging to the Hausman type of labour supply 
models (Hausman, 1979), based on marginal calculus, or the discrete choice labour supply model (van 
Soest, 1995) can be used to predict or evaluate the effects of policy change on the distribution of well-
being. 
Although the effects of policy change on money metric utility occupy a key position in applied 
welfare analysis, policy change assessments often continue to be made in terms of changes in net or 
disposable income. There seems to be resistance among analysts to exploiting the full capacity of the 
labour supply model and using more comprehensive welfare metrics in studies of the effects of tax 
policy on the distribution of well-being, such as money metric utility. Exceptions include Aaberge, 
Dagsvik, and Strøm (1995), Kornstad and Thoresen (2006), Labeaga, Olivier, and Spadaro (2008), 
Dagsvik, Locatelli, and Strøm, (2009), Creedy, Hérault, and Kalb (2011), Creedy and Hérault (2012), 
Bargain, Decoster, Dolls, Neumann, Peichl, and Siegloch (2013) and Decoster and Haan (2015).  
One possible reason behind the reluctance to use measures of money metric utility in applied 
work is that it brings to the surface the complications of comparing the welfare of heterogeneous 
agents. The static labour supply model enriches the analysis of welfare implications of policy change 
in that it facilitates for accounting for heterogeneity in labour supply choice, but heterogeneity is also a 
source to complication in the discussion of welfare implications. For example, how can we compare 
the welfare of a hard-working person with a low wage to a high-ability person with the same income 
level and much more leisure? Such questions have a long tradition in the theoretical social choice 
literature and have recently been addressed in studies of “equality of opportunity” (Roemer 1998) and 
in the “fair treatment” literature (Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2011). Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011) 
develop a normative theory of social justice based on a distinction between individual constraints 
(outside the individual responsibility), that may invoke calls for compensation, and preferences, such 
as strong preferences for leisure, which fall within the responsibility of the individual and therefore 
should not be compensated. 
However, these advances of the theoretical literature on the understanding and 
conceptualisation of welfare do not seem to have been followed up by corresponding developments of 
modelling tools to be used in applied analysis. The main point of the present paper is that, given the 
preference-constraint dyad, a particular labour supply model, the so-called “job choice model” 
(Dagsvik, 1994; Dagsvik and Strøm, 2006; Dagsvik, Jia, Kornstad, and Thoresen, 2014; Dagsvik and 
Jia, 2016), is well-suited for practical work. The job choice model emphasises that individuals face 
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restrictions when they choose jobs and hours of work and therefore represents a more realistic 
depiction of the actual choices of heterogeneous individuals than the conventional labour supply 
model. Moreover, using this model to simulate the effects of policy change facilitates for a deeper 
understanding of the interpretation of results along the preference-constraint dimension. For example, 
it facilitates controlling for differences in the number of options in the labour market across 
individuals (outside individual control). The effects of a tax policy change can then be discussed by 
neutralising individual characteristics that are “constraints” in the labour market, which bring us to 
estimates of changes in the distribution of money metric utility that can be characterised as primarily 
belonging to the preference part of individual choice. This configuration therefore produces 
distributional effects under a specification of fewer choice constraints, which can be compared to to 
other descriptions. Here, the job choice model is used to describe the distributional effects of the 
Norwegian tax reform 2013–2019 as measured by compensating variation (CV).   
The job choice model is an extension of the conventional discrete labour supply model (van 
Soest, 1995). In contrast to the conventional discrete labour supply model, the job choice model is 
explicitly tailored to accommodate the fact that an agent in the labour market faces a latent set of job 
opportunities, where each “job” is characterised by fixed hours of work, wage rate and other latent 
non-pecuniary attributes (tasks to be performed in the job, location, social environment, etc.). The 
distribution of labour supply in the job choice model has a similar functional form to that of the 
conventional discrete choice labour supply model – the key difference is that it depends on a measure 
that captures the respective latent choice sets of job opportunities. It turns out that under the 
distributional assumptions of the random taste-shifters, the choice sets can be conveniently represented 
by the number of jobs for the hours of work in each case, denoted opportunity measure. 
Accordingly, when the job choice model is used to simulate the effects of policy change, EV 
and CV become functions of the budget constraint, the wage rate, the opportunity measure and the 
individual-specific covariates. Consequently, the job choice model allows the analyst to assess the 
welfare effect of policy interventions where either a budget constraint (tax, wage rate or non-labour 
income) is changed or the opportunity measure is changed, or both. The computation of welfare 
measures in the job choice model is not straightforward because the utilities are stochastic, and 
therefore the corresponding welfare measures also become stochastic. Both simulation approaches 
(McFadden, 1999) as well as analytic approaches (Dagsvik and Karlström, 2005) have been developed 
to calculate the distribution of EV and CV, which we come back to in the following.1 
                                                     
1 See also Herriges and Kling (1999) for a review of the state of the art as well as previous contributions. 
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The use of measures of money metric utility has been the topic of much criticism and 
controversy, see Slesnick (1998), Decancq, Fleurbaey, and Schokkaert (2015) and Fleurbaey and 
Blanchet (2013). There appears to be considerable scepticism regarding interpersonal comparison of 
well-being when individuals differ along several dimensions, such as having different preferences and 
facing dissimilar constraints. As a result, some studies have neglected preference heterogeneity at the 
normative stage of the analysis of money metric utilities, by letting all individuals have the same 
common preference ordering, that of a reference unit at reference prices; see King (1983).2  
In the present analysis, however, we maintain preference heterogeneity at the welfare 
aggregation stage as well. Then a practical issue in this type of analysis concerns the choice of 
reference price. In fact, our contribution can be seen as alluding to the choice of reference prices for 
interpersonal comparison in analysis of welfare, as we propose to use the use the job choice model to 
specify a suitable welfare metric. In practical work, some authors continue using the individual-
specific information in the welfare aggregation part of the analysis, whereas others argue that 
interpersonal comparison is achieved by using a common reference value (Preston and Walker, 1999; 
Decancq, Fleurbaey, and Schokkaert 2015; Decoster and Haan, 2015). The latter approach can be seen 
as establishing a measure of money metric utility based on finding an equivalent to the indirect utility 
of individual i , ( , )i iv y p , where iy  is income and ip  is the individual-specific price. This means that 
we define a corresponding income equivalent, seen as * *( , )iv y p , where 
*p  is the reference price. A 
major challenge is that this reference price may be arbitrarily chosen and that the ranking of social 
states need not be invariant to this choice (Slesnick, 1998). Preston and Walker (1999) and Decoster 
and Haan (2015) discuss possible choices of reference value and the welfare metrics implied.3 
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011) argue that the choice of reference price does not need to be 
arbitrary; it can be guided by clear normative principles. The so-called fairness approach to social 
choice by Fleurbaey and Maniquet is helpful for ranking individuals when outcomes differ with 
respect to endowed circumstances and individual preferences. Our contribution to this discussion 
comes with a practical angle: we demonstrate how a reference situation can be further characterised by 
applying a more advanced labour supply model, controlling for individual differences with respect to 
options in the labour market. As such, the present analysis provides answers to requests for broader 
definition of reference sets (Fleurbaey and Blanchet, 2013; Fleurbaey, 2015).  
The paper is organised as follows: The job choice model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 
presents methods for obtaining measures of the welfare effect of tax policy change by applying a 
                                                     
2 More fundamentally, Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) argue that social welfare functions that use money metric utility 
functions as arguments need not be quasi-concave, and therefore exhibit undesirable ethical properties. 
3 See also Carpantier and Sapata (2016). 
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discrete choice labour supply model, and we also describe how the job choice model, with its 
emphasis on choice set differences across individuals, can be applied. The empirical illustrations of the 
effects of policy change on measures of change in the money metric utility are presented in Section 4. 
Section 5 provides a conclusion for the paper. 
2. The job choice model 
It is a major theoretical and econometric challenge to develop models that are able to represent labour 
market behaviour in a reasonably realistic way, and at the same time are practical to apply in an 
empirical setting. The difficulty stems from the fact that budget constraints are nonlinear (piecewise 
linear) and may imply non-convex budget sets. This type of budget set follows from the tax systems in 
use in many countries, where deduction rules for different types of tax and withdrawal of social 
security payments at the lower income levels imply that marginal tax rates may not increase 
monotonically with income but may in fact decrease in specific income intervals.4 Furthermore, it is 
complicated to apply the usual textbook approach based on marginal calculus unless simple labour 
supply functional forms are used (MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch, 1990). 
The use of discrete choice models has therefore become increasingly popular, as this approach 
drastically simplifies the implementation of complex nonlinear budget constraints, for instance for 
spouses in two-adult households (van Soest, 1995). Details of complex tax and transfer systems can 
easily be accommodated, and simulations of alternative policies can be carried out relatively 
straightforwardly. Examples of labour supply studies which are based on the discrete choice 
framework include Keane and Moffitt (1998), Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000), van 
Soest, Das, and Gong (2002), and Haan and Steiner (2005). 
However, as we mentioned above, the conventional discrete labour supply model (van Soest, 
1995) is silent about possible restrictions individuals are likely to face in the labour market. Indeed, in 
most countries observed hours of work figures show considerable peaks at full-time and possibly part-
time hours of work, which indicates that most jobs only offer full-time or part-time hours of work 
schedules. This evidence has been the key motivation for developing the so-called job choice model, 
which is an extension of the conventional discrete labour supply model (Dagsvik, 1994; Dagsvik and 
Strøm, 2006; Dagsvik, Jia, Kornstad, and Thoresen, 2014; Dagsvik and Jia, 2016). This extension is 
based on the assumption that the fundamental choice variable is “job type”, where the jobs are 
characterised by given hours of work, wage rate and other non-pecuniary job-specific attributes. 
                                                     
4 Early contributions to the modelling of labour supply in a continuous choice context were made by Burtless and Hausman 
(1978) and Hausman (1979). 
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Furthermore, not all the jobs in the market are available to every individual, and most individuals are 
likely to face restrictions on their set of job possibilities and hours of work. It is this characteristic of 
the model which we argue in the present study can be used in applied welfare analysis. 
 We provide an outline of the job choice model. For simplicity we only consider 
households with a single decision maker. The extension to the case of married couples is briefly 
reviewed in the Appendix, see Section A.1. As the module for married couples is used to produce 
empirical illustrations in the present study, estimation results for couples are provided. 
Households derive utility from household consumption, here set equal to household disposable 
income, leisure and non-pecuniary attributes of latent jobs. Let 1,2,...,z =  be an indexation of the jobs 
and let 0z =  represent the alternative of not working. The utility function is assumed to have the form 
(2.1)     ( ) ( ), , log , ( , )U C h z u C h z hµ ε= + +   and ( ,0) ( ,0) (0)U C u C ε= +   
where (C, h) denotes disposable income and annual hours of work, ( , )u C h  is a suitable deterministic 
and continuous function that is common to all observationally identical individuals and ( , )z hε  is a 
stochastic error term (taste-shifter) that is supposed to capture unobserved heterogeneity of preferences 
relating to combinations of hours of work and job-specific attributes. Finally, logµ  is a constant that 
represents the “intrinsic” utility of being employed. This parameter permits a discontinuous jump of 
the utility when hours of work tend from the smallest positive value to zero. Here it is assumed that 
each job offers only a single given work schedule. Let B(h) denote the set of jobs with hours of work 
h  that are available to the individual. Further, let D  be the set of feasible hours, including zero hours. 
The set B(h), ,h D∈  is individual-specific and latent. The terms { ( , )}z hε are assumed to be i.i.d. 
across individuals and across jobs for given h with the standard Gumbel cumulative distribution 
function exp( ),xe−−  for real x. The reason why the index z enters the utility function is that job-
specific attributes other than wage and hours of work may affect the utility of the agents. For given 
hours of work h  and wage rate w , household disposable income is given by ( ),C f hw y=  where y  
is non-labour income and ( )f ⋅  is the function that transforms gross income into disposable income.5 
Let ( )g hθ  denote the number of jobs in ( )B h  where ( )g h  is the fraction of jobs with hours of work h 
                                                     
5 A more general formulation of the job choice model than the one assumed in this paper could allow for both intra- and 
inter-individual variations in wage rates. To this end, consider the general wage equation log ( ) ( )W z Rb zλ ξ= + +  where R 
is a vector of covariates, λ  is an individual-specific random effect and ( )zξ  is an individual and job-specific random term 
that varies independently across jobs, with c.d.f. that is the same for all individuals. As discussed by Dagsvik and Jia (2016), 
one cannot achieve identification of this wage equation without strong functional form assumptions. In this paper, as well as 
in Dagsvik and Jia (2016) it is assumed that ( ) 0zξ =  whereas Aaberge, Colombino, and Strøm (2004) assume that 0.λ =  
Dagsvik and Jia (2016) have tested the specification with ( ) 0zξ =  against the specification with 0λ =  and they found that 
the former, with ( ) 0zξ = , was rejected by their data whereas the latter was not. 
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that are available (to the individual) and θ  is the total number of jobs that are available (to the 
individual).  Here, both θ  and g(h) may depend on observed individual characteristics. Thus, ( )g hθ  
is the opportunity measure referred to above,6 which is the focus of attention in the present study. To 
extend the reference set (or equivalent income) we remove the individual-specific element of ( )g hθ , 
and obtain estimates of CV when this constraint does not differ across individuals. 
From (2.1) it follows that the highest utility the agent can attain, given hours equal to h, is 
equal to 
(2.2a)    
( ) ( )
( , ) max ( ( , ), , ) log ( ( , ), ) max ( , )
z B h z B h
V h y U f hw y h z u f hw y h z hµ ε
∈ ∈
= = + +  
and 
(2.2b)  (0, ) ( (0, ),0) ( (0, ),0) (0).V y U f y u f y ε= = +   
It follows immediately from (2.2a, b) and the Gumbel distributional assumption that the probability 
( )hϕ  of choosing a job with hours of work equal to h becomes  
(2.3a)    ( )
\{0}
exp( ( ( , ), )) ( )( ) ( , ) max ( )
exp( ( (0, ),0)) exp( ( ( ), ) ( )x D
x D
u f wh y h g hh P V h y V x,y








(2.3b)    ( )
\{0}
exp( ( (0, ),0))(0) (0, ) max ( ) .
exp( ( (0, ),0)) exp( ( ( ), ) ( )x D
x D
u f yP V y V x,y







The distribution assumptions about the random error terms { ( , )}z hε can be justified by the notion of 
probabilistic rationality (Luce, 1977) expressed by the Choice Axiom of Luce. It has the fortunate 
implication that the choice sets of job opportunities can be represented by the respective number of 
jobs in the respective choice sets { ( )}.B h  Given the information available in most datasets, the term 
µ  cannot be identified separately from θ  and it can therefore be normalized to 1. This implies that 
the estimate of θ  can no longer be interpreted as the number of jobs available to the worker, but it can 
still be interpreted as a measure of job availability since µ  is a constant preference factor. 
                                                     
6 We do not discuss the formation of the choice sets of available jobs. Dagsvik (2000) and Dagsvik and Jia (2018) consider 
the job choice model in a two-sided matching setting in which workers are searching for a suitable job and firms are looking 
for suitable workers. Under quite general conditions on the distribution of stochastic preferences, it turns out that the resulting 
choice model of the workers in large labour markets has the same structure as the job choice model above. Dagsvik and Jia 
(2018) demonstrate that the sizes of the endogenous and stochastic choice sets of jobs converge towards deterministic terms 
when the labour market becomes large. 
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3. Welfare measurement  
3.1. Stochastic measures of money metric utility 
In order to conduct welfare analyses we need to obtain welfare measures (EV or CV) for the job choice 
model. To this end, we first need to derive expressions for the corresponding indirect utility function. 
Due to the distributional assumptions of the random error terms, we show in the Appendix (Section 
A.2), that the conditional indirect utility given h (and given the opportunity sets) is equivalent to (has 
the same distribution as)  
(3.1a)  ( , ) ( ( , ), ) log( ( )) ( )V h y u f hw y h g h hθ η= + +  
for 0>h , where ( )hη  is the error term, and  
(3.1b)  (0, ) ( (0, ),0) (0) ( (0, ),0) (0)V y u f y u f yε η= + = +  
for 0=h , where (0), (1), (2),...,ε η η  are i.i.d. with standard Gumbel c.d.f. It is indeed a convenient 
property of the Gumbel c.d.f. that the distribution of { ( )}hη  turns out to be the same as the 
distribution of { ( , )}.z hε  Thus, we see from (3.1a) that the indirect utility function differs from the 
corresponding indirect utility in the standard discrete choice model by the logarithm of the opportunity 
measure. We realise that the calculation of EV and CV in the job choice model can be done in the same 
way as in the conventional discrete labour supply model, but with the addition of a term representing 
job options, log( ( ))θ g h . 
 In the empirical model (see Section A.1 in the Appendix) the deterministic part of the 
utility function and the opportunity measure depend on individual characteristics. Specifically, θ  may 
depend on schooling and gender whereas ( )g h , which is thought to represent overall institutional 
constraints, is determined by the nature of the tasks to be performed and by negotiations between 
labour unions. Since the job model accounts for preference heterogeneity as well as heterogeneity in 
job opportunities it opens for the possibility of computing welfare measures that imply compensation 
for differences in job opportunities.  
 Consider now a policy change in the budget set and the opportunity measure where the 
ex-ante function f is changed to the ex post function f  and the opportunity measure and wage rate 
are changed from ( ( ), )g h wθ  to ( ( ), ).g h wθ    Define  
    ( , , ( )) ( , ) log( ( ))v C h g h u C h g hθ θ= +   
when h is positive and  
     ( ,0, (0)) ( ,0)v C g u Cθ =   
when h = 0. Using this notation and (3.1a) and (3.1b), the CV measure for individual i is defined by 
11 
 (3.2)       max ( ( ( , ), , ( )) ( )) max ( ( ( , ) , , ( )) ( ))h D i i i i i i h D i i i i i i iv f w h y h g h h v f w h y CV h g h hθ η θ η∈ ∈+ = + +      
where the indexation of the individual refers to the individual-specific covariates that are suppressed in 
the notation above. This definition of CV is analogous to the standard definition; see McFadden 
(1999). It follows that CV is stochastic because it depends on all the stochastic terms { ( )}i hη and that it 
incorporates the opportunity measure.7 Section A.4 in the Appendix shows how measures of EV and 
CV can be obtained under this framework.8  
3.2. Welfare comparisons with heterogeneous tastes 
Fleurbay and Maniquet (2011) demonstrate how to derive individual welfare metrics in terms of 
money metric utility in a normative framework.9 They argue that reference sets should be selected on 
the basis of clear normative principles, or at least the normative choices should be made explicit 
(Decancq, Fleurbaey, and Schokkaert, 2015).10  Our take on this challenge is to direct attention to 
model realism for obtaining welfare metrics; as information is obtained from revealed preferences, a 
rich and realistic model is beneficial. We argue that the job choice model represents a way forward in 
this respect.  
 The money metric utility or equivalent income is defined as the amount of money 
hypothetically needed under reference prices that would give everyone their  current level of 
satisfaction (Slesnick, 1998; Fleurbaey, 2015). In the following, we illustrate the contribution of the 
present paper in such a framework. Let ( , , )i i i iv y p q  denote the indirect utility obtained by individual 
i  with income iy , prices ip  and other conditions iq . As in Fleurbaey (2015), the comparable money 
metric utility, *iy  must satisfy 
* * *( , , ) ( , , )i i i i i iv y p q v y p q= , where 
*p  is a reference price vector and *q
represents other dimensions that one may also take into account. In other words, to obtain  *iy , we 
need to assign a common wage to each individual, thereby setting a reference price vector (symbolised 
by *p ), and more importantly, assigning a common *q . Given that our labour supply model holds 
properties that facilitate controlling for important dimensions in the compensation-responsibility dyad 
in the discussion on fairness of taxation, we maintain that applying the job choice model in practical 
work is an example of bringing empirical content to analysis along these lines.  
                                                     
7 There are no closed-form formulae for EV and CV. However, Dagsvik and Karlström (2005) give formulae for the 
distribution and moments of CV. Section A.3 in the Appendix summarises this approach.  
8 Another empirical concern is how the change in the money metric measure, in this case CV, should be aggregated in a 
population. We return to this in the discussion of empirical results in Section 4. 
9 However, the approach of Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011) is characterized as non-welfarist, as it relies on fairness 
principles.  
10 See also Piacquadio (2017) and Bosmans, Decancq and Ooghe (2018) on the aggregation of money metric utility. 
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More precisely, we redefine Equation (3.2), to compute CV due to a change in the tax 
system,11 by controlling for individual heterogeneity in wage rates and opportunities by introducing a 
reference wage rate 0w (say) and a reference opportunity measure ( )0 0g hθ  (say). A common 
reference wage means that inequalities arising from inequalities in ability is removed, which can be 
argued belong to circumstances outside the individual’s control.12 The control for differences in 
opportunities in the labour market, represented by 0 0 ( )g hθ , adds to controlling for conditions outside 
the control of individuals. The corresponding CV measure now becomes  
(3.3)     0 0 0 0 0 0max ( ( ( , ), , ( )) ( )) max ( ( ( , ) , , ( )) ( )).h D i i i h D i i i iv f w h y h g h h v f w h y CV h g h hθ η θ η∈ ∈+ = + +  
It follows that the resulting measure of change in money metric utility therefore gets closer to 
representing preferences, and the distribution of CV derived from Equation (3.3) can be interpreted 
accordingly.  
4. Welfare effects of the Norwegian tax reform 2013–2019 
4.1 The Norwegian tax reform 2013–2019 
In this section we describe the distributional effects of the Norwegian tax reform 2013–2019 by 
discussing measures of the distribution of CV distribution. The Norwegian tax reform 2013–2019 
followed two major reforms of the tax system in 1992 and 2006. The former introduced the dual 
income tax system in Norway, while the latter maintained the system with important modifications; 
see Sørensen (2005). Notably, the post-1992 tax system has adhered to the principle that the tax rate 
on personal capital income should equal the corporate tax rate. Throughout the period from 1992 to 
2014, the tax rate applied to both tax bases was 28 percent. The tax schedule for labour earnings has 
been designed as consisting of the same basic tax rate as that on capital income, supplemented by a 
surtax schedule with several brackets and a 7.8 percent national insurance contribution. 
The motivation for the 2013–2019 reform is different from the considerations underlying the 
1992 and 2006 reforms. It is the level of the basic tax rate applicable to capital and labour income and 
business profits that creates pressure now. A tax on corporate profits of 28 percent was low at the time 
of its introduction in 1992 (Ministry of Finance, 2015), but in subsequent decades Norway was left 
behind in the international tax competition (Devereux, Griffith, and Klemm, 2002), ending up with 
statutory tax rates well above the average in the OECD and in EU-28 (Ministry of Finance, 2015). To 
                                                     
11 We focus on estimates of CV in the following; similar estimates of EV are straightforwardly obtained by the same method. 
12 Of course, it can be argued that the wage is determined by factors that can be viewed as being under the individual’s 
control, such as effort. This raises fundamental questions concerning the distinction between “efforts” and “endowments”, 
which is beyond the scope of the present analysis. 
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improve the international tax position of Norway, the main element of the 2013–2019 reform was a 
gradual lowering of the corporate tax rate. Due to the link to the basic tax rate on general income of 
persons, following from the design of the Norwegian version of the dual income tax, the immediate 
consequence was a cut in the flat-rate part of the tax on labour earnings as well as the tax rate on 
personal capital income, down to 22 percent in 2019. Together these tax rate cuts obviously implied a 
significant loss of tax revenue, and a major challenge was to offset at least a substantial part of the 
foregone revenue. The main move has been to introduce more steps in the schedule for the progressive 
part of the tax on labour income, previously referred to as the surtax schedule. To distinguish the new 
schedule from the old one, the term “step-tax” was adopted to reflect the larger number of steps in the 
new step-wise linear income tax. 
 
Figure 1. Marginal tax rates, 2013 and 2019 
 
 
In Figure 1 the new schedule (as of 2019) is compared to the schedule of 2013. The figure 
clearly illustrates that there are two additional steps in 2019, compared to 2013, and that the 2019 rates 
in general are lower than those of 2013. The first step generates revenue at lower levels by introducing 
the first step, an addition of 1.9 percentage points, whereas the next step (2.3 percentage points) kicks 
in when the basic allowance is exhausted, which brings the marginal tax rate in the interval from 
approximately 230,000 Norwegian kroner (NOK)13 to around NOK 600,000 very close to the pre-
                                                     
13 This corresponds to approximately 23,500 euros and 26,000 U.S. dollars according to average exchange rates for 2019: 
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reform schedule, see Figure 1. The two last steps basically replicate the two-tier surtax schedule of the 
pre-reform system, with somewhat lower rates. 
4.2 Distributions of CV 
In the following we discuss the welfare effects of the tax reform 2013–2019 by obtaining distributions 
of CV, applying the measure of CV introduced in Section 3 and using the simulation approach of 
McFadden (1999); for the latter, see Appendix 4. The empirical results are derived by means of a 
discrete choice labour supply simulation model developed for Norwegian policy-makers under the 
name LOTTE-Arbeid (Aasness, Dagsvik, and Thoresen, 2007), which is based on the job choice 
framework (see Section 2).14 We focus on the labour supply of married/cohabiting couples. The 
couples are unitary, which means that they make harmonised decisions with respect to the labour 
supply of each spouse, given a common budget constraint; see more details on practical 
implementation in Dagsvik, Jia, Kornstad, and Thoresen (2014), Thoresen and Vattø (2015) and 
Dagsvik and Jia (2016). We let the female of the couple choose between 8 different hours of work, 
whereas males have 7 discrete choices, which gives the couple a total of 56 possibilities. Given that 
the tax reductions of the reform make most taxpayers better off after the reform, measures of CV are 
negative. It follows from this that the taxpayers benefitting most from the reform have large negative 
money metric compensations. 
 In the discussion of results, we refer to descriptions of three different simulation 
alternatives. First, we obtain measures of welfare change when using individual-specific information 
to establish the reference set, similar to what has been derived previously by means of discrete choice 
models; see, for example, Aaberge, Dagsvik, and Strøm (1995), Labeaga, Olivier, and Spadaro (2008), 
and Dagsvik, Locatelli, and Strøm (2009). We characterize this as the benchmark. Second, we obtain 
estimates for distributions of CV for two definitions of the reference set (see Section 3.2), which are 
compared to the benchmark distribution: one alternative where we assign a fixed identical wage to 
males and females, and a second where we let labour market opportunities across families be equalised 
as well. As discussed in Section 2, it is possible to obtain estimates for the latter alternative because of 
an idiosyncratic characteristic of the job choice model, which provides individual measures of labour 
market opportunities as its output. To assess the effects of the different stages of the analysis, we 
address differences in the distribution of CV for the different simulations. Ultimately, the ambition is 
to end up with a measure of CV which results largely from individual preferences, here operationalised 
by assigning an identical wage to the individuals and equalising the number of options in the labour 
                                                     
14 This partial perspective means (of course) that general equilibrium effects are left out of the analysis. 
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market. Distributional effects according to these variations in specifications are informative about 
distributional effects from a preference-constraint perspective, answering to the challenge of, for 
example, Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011) to distinguish between preferences and matters outside 
individual control. 
 Table 1 describes summary statistics for the three alternative simulations: first, for the 
benchmark simulation based on employing individual-specific information for both wages and options 
in the labour market (referred to as “No reference set restriction” in Table 1); second, for a simulation 
in which wages are fixed by gender; and third, for a simulation in which both wages (for males and 
females) and options in the labour market ( ( )g hθ ) are fixed across individuals. Recall that CV 
measures the income needed to restore an individual's original level of utility following the policy 
change. Accordingly, as most people benefit from the reform, the compensations become negative. As 
we use McFadden’s simulation approach, based on draws for the random part of the utility function 
(see Appendix A.4), we obtain expected (or mean) values of CV for each household, which are input 
for the calculation of population means in Table 1.15 
The distributional effects of the reform in terms of CV are described by four different graphs 
for each of the three different simulations. Figure 2 (for the benchmark case) serves as an example for 
the informational content. In Figure 2, the frequency distribution is described first, in the upper left-
hand diagram. We find measures of CV from 0 to around NOK -75,000, with the majority in the range 
NOK -5,000 to NOK -20,000. Next, distributions of CV are described against non-labour income, 
disposable income, age and years of schooling.16 Of course, another possibility is to describe CV 
distributions when the individuals are ranked according to equivalent income (or money metric 
utility). We do not show that type of result here, restricting ourselves to using money metric utility as a 
measure of the effect of tax reform and using other measures of well-being, such as disposable 
income, for ranking individuals. 
Table 1. Summary statistics for simulation results 
Simulation ( )E CV  Interquartile range, NOK 
No reference set restriction -66,027 11,738 
Fixed wage -62,927 1,598 
Fixed wage, fixed ( )g hθ  -63,921 1,518 
Notes. Values in Norwegian kroner 
                                                     
15 The average values reported in Table 1 are substantially above the peaks of the distributions (which we return to soon), due 
to some large (negative) outlier observations. 
16 For couples we use the average across partners. 
16 
The results shown in Figure 2 reflect the fact that the tax reform involved substantial 
reductions in capital income taxation, which is included in non-labour income. The tax reform benefits 
those with high non-labour income to a greater extent; see top right-hand side diagram of Figure 2, 
i.e., those with high non-labour income are willing to pay most for the reform, and thus have the 
largest negative compensation. This result is also applicable to disposable income (middle left-hand 
side diagram); the largest negative compensation is seen for the high end of the distribution of 
disposable income.17 The relationship to age is less clear, whereas years of schooling increase with 
(negative) CV. 
 
Figure 2. Effects on CV of the Norwegian tax reform, 2013–2019. Observed individual wage 
and individual job opportunities  
 
Notes. The figure contains four graphs, each showing a CV distribution. The density distribution of CV is shown top left. The 
graphs at top right and bottom left show the distribution of CV against non-labour income and disposable income, 
respectively. The bottom right-hand graph shows the relationship between CV and education. As estimates of CV are based 
on random draws, we obtain mean values for each household. 
 
                                                     
17 These results are in line with Christiansen, Jia and Thoresen (2021), who find that the reform can be justified (it gives an 
overall welfare gain) only if moderate inequality aversion prevails. Results are derived under the assumption of a trade-off 
between allocative efficiency gains and redistributive losses.  
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Next, Figure 3 shows distributional effects when the first step of establishing a reference set 
for interpersonal comparison is taken: the wage rates for females and males are fixed as NOK 275 for 
males and NOK 255 for females. The figure reveals that the main implication of assigning the same 
wage to everyone is that the variability in CV for the same level of non-labour income and disposable 
income becomes much smaller. This is expected, given that a substantial source of variation, differing 
wages, is removed. It follows that the main pattern of Figure 2, in which CV increases with respect to 
both non-labour income and disposable income, becomes even more pronounced in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  Effects on CV of the Norwegian tax reform, 2013–2019. Identical gender-specific 
wage and individual job opportunities 
 
Notes. The figure includes four graphs, each showing a distribution of CV. The density distribution of CV is shown top left. 
Top right and bottom left-show the distribution of CV against non-labour income and disposable income, respectively. The 
graph at bottom right shows the relationship between CV and education. As estimates of CV are based on random draws, we 
obtain mean values for each household. 
 
Finally, Figure 4 shows the distributional effects of adding the second part of our reference set 
formulation:  the cancellation of individuals with different options in the labour market; see Equation 
(3.3). In practice this is done by letting all individuals face the same number of options in the labour 
market corresponding to having 13 years of education (given that options in the labour market increase 
in years of education). As wage rates are fixed and gender-specific and job options do not vary across 
individuals, the resulting CV distribution depicts a distribution of the welfare effects of the reform that 
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primarily reflect preferences, as we have operationalised it here. This simulation implies that two 
characteristics assigned to “outside individual control”, i.e. the wage and the number of job options in 
the labour market, are controlled for. 
 
Figure 4.  Effects on CV of the Norwegian tax reform, 2013–2019. Identical gender-specific 
wage and identical job opportunities 
 
Notes. The figure includes four graphs, each showing distributions of CV. The density distribution of CV is shown top left. 
Top right and bottom left graphs show the distribution of CV against non-labour income and disposable income, respectively. 
The graph at bottom right shows the relationship between CV and education. As estimates of CV are based on random draws, 
we obtain mean values for each household. 
 
The results of Figure 4 do not seem to deviate much from what we see in Figure 3, but there 
are important differences between the two simulation results. This is demonstrated by Figure 5, which 
shows differences between pairs of simulations; cross-plots of CV, distribution of difference in CV 
according to the simulations and cross-plots of household rankings. Thus, each row of Figure 5 
describes pair-wise differences in simulation results for the following three simulations: individual-
specific wage rates and individual-specific labour market opportunities (reported in Figure 2); gender-
specific wage rates and individual-specific labour market opportunities (Figure 3); and gender-specific 
wage rates and equal number of job offers in the labour market (Figure 4). This means that in the 
upper row of Table 5 we compare results reported in Figure 2 and Figure 3, the middle row shows 
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differences between Figure 2 and Figure 4, and the bottom row shows differences between Figure 3 
and Figure 4. 
 
Figure 5. Comparison of three simulations 
Notes. The three rows in the figure describe comparisons between three simulations. From left to right: crossplot of CV, 
distribution of difference in CV, and crossplot of household rankings. In the upper row of the table, the benchmark alternative 
is compared to the common wage (gender-specific) alternative, the middle row shows a comparison of the benchmark 
alternative and the alternative with both common wage and common labour market options, and the bottom row shows a 
comparison of the common wage alternative and the alternative with both common wage and common labour market. 
 
The middle graph of the bottom row of Figure 5 shows that when wages have already been 
equalised, neutralising the number of job options has an additional effect. Although the choices of 
many individuals do not change, the difference in CV is between NOK 1 and NOK 2,000 for a large 
number of people. This also means that the ranking of individuals in terms of CV depends on the 
definition of the reference set, which is shown by the bottom right graph in Figure 5.  
The goal of this exercise is to obtain reform results based on a configuration which primarily 
generates preference-driven measures of CV. The results presented in Figure 4 represent this, showing 
20 
the effects of the 2013–2019 Norwegian tax reform in terms of distributions of a measure of CV 
resulting from removing characteristics defined as outside individual control. These results therefore 
exemplify how to proceed in order to develop a practical framework for discussing the effects of tax 
reforms in a “fair tax treatment” perspective. As such, the present analysis provides a way forward in 
empirical work, given the preference-constraint dichotomy of the new fairness literature, for example 
as developed by Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011).  
5. Conclusion 
The change in money metric utility is a widely accepted means of describing the effects of tax reforms 
on individual utility and other changes in the decision-making environment of economic agents. 
Inspired by recent discussions in the social justice literature, we suggest that a particular discrete 
choice model, under the name “job choice model”, can be used in practical work. Despite an 
increasing focus on characterising welfare in terms of money metric utility, which paves the way for 
differentiating between individual choice circumstances and preferences, we see less attention being 
paid to empirical work along these lines. For example, the advances of Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011) 
do not seem to have been followed up by corresponding developments on the empirical side. 
The present paper argues that the job choice model is tailored to address the distinction 
between responsibilities and constraints, demonstrating how such a tool can be used to provide 
information about the distribution of welfare effects of a policy change, such as a tax reform. As for 
the standard discrete choice model, the job choice model facilitates for accounting for heterogeneity in 
labour supply choice. By neutralising differences in individual wages and differences between 
individuals with respect to labour market options, it is argued that we obtain estimates of CV which 
can be characterised as primarily belonging to the preference part of individual choice. Thus, the 
present paper demonstrates how one may obtain empirical counterparts to recent theoretical advances 
in welfare analysis, such as those of Fleurbaey and Maniquet, where the distinction between 
preferences and constraints is pivotal. 
When this is applied to the Norwegian tax reform of 2013–2019, we get negative CV values, 
as most individuals benefit from the reform. Negative CV values increase for both disposable income 
and non-labour income, and this pattern does not change when measures of CV reflecting preferences 
alone are obtained, in the manner defined and operationalised here. The distribution of a “preference-
assigned” CV shows more precise relationships between CV and disposable income/non-labour 
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A.1. Empirical labour supply model for married couples, with estimation results 
The modeling framework for two-person households is completely similar to the case for single- 
person households. Let ( ), , ,F MU C h h z  denote the utility function of a household, where hF and hM are 
hours of work for female and male and ( ),F Mz z z=  indexes the combination of jobs for the female 
and male in the household, respectively. As with one-person households, assume that 
( ) ( ), , , , , ( )F M F MU C h h z u C h h zε= + , with interpretation that is completely analogous to the case 
above. The budget constraint in this case can be written as 
(A.1) ( ), ,F F M MC f h W h W I=  
where FW and MW  are the wage rates for female and male, respectively, and ( ).f  is the function that 
transforms gross income to household disposable income. Let ( ), | , ,F M F Mh h W W Iϕ  be the joint 
density of hours of work for female and male in the household, given wage rates and non-labour 
income. The empirical counterpart of this density is the fraction of couples where the husband works 
Fh  hours and the wife works Mh  hours, within the subpopulation of couples with wage rates and non-
labor income equal to ( ), ,F MW W I . We assume furthermore that the offered hours, provided, FH and 
FH , are independent. For simplicity let 
(A.2) ( ) ( )( ), ; , , , , , ,F M F M F F M M F Mh h W W I v f h W h W I h hψ = .  
Then, under exactly the same assumptions as for one-person households we obtain the conditional 
density of ( ),F Mh h , which, given that 0Mh > , equals 
(A.3) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ; , ,, | , , F M F M F F M MF M F M
h h W W I m h m h
h h W W I
M
ψ
ϕ = , 
for 0, 0F Mh h> > , and 
(A.4) ( ) ( ) ( )0, ; , ,0, | , , M F M M MM F M
h W W I m h
h W W I
M
ψ
ϕ =  
for 0Fh =  and 0Mh = , where 
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(A.5) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 , 0,
, , 0, ; , , ( ) , | , , ( ) ( )F M F M M F M F M
y x y
M W W I y W W I m y x y W W I m x m yψ ψ
> >
= +∑ ∑ . 
The opportunity measure for females, Fθ , is assumed to depend on wages based solely on the amount 
of schooling. Specifically, we assume that 
(A.6) 1 2log F F Ff f Sθ = + , 
where S is the length of education. Furthermore, we specify ( )⋅v  as having the form 
(A.7)           
( ) ( ) ( )
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where ( )25 6 7 8 9log log 6 6β α α α α α= + + + +F F FA A CU CO  and
( )210 11 12 13 14log log 6 6β α α α α α= + + + +M M MA A CU CO , C0 is subsistence level, , , ,kA k F M=  is 
the age for gender k divided by 10, CU6 and CO6 are the number of children under or equal to and 
over the age of six, respectively, C is given by the budget constraint in the same way as (2.2), 
, , ,kL k F M=  represent leisure for gender k, with 1 3650,k kL h= −  and , 1,2,...,15j jα = , are 
unknown parameters. Note that we have subtracted from total annual hours a “subsistence” level, 0L = 
5,110 hours, which allows for sleep and rest. This corresponds to about 14 hours per day reserved for 
sleep and rest. We have chosen C0 to be approximately NOK 40,000 N , where N is the number of 
persons in the household. Disposable income, C, is measured as the sum of the annual household wage 





Table A.1. Estimates of wage equations, females and males, 1997 
 
 
Males Females Females (selection 
corrected) 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Constant 4.08 135.1 4.10 132 4.11 109 
Experience in 
years/10 
0.22 12.2 0.143 8.6 0.141 7.8 
(Experience in 
years/10)2 
–0.03 –10.1 –0.022 –6.6 –0.022 –6.1 
Education in years 0.044 26.9 0.0388 23.1 0.0386 19.7 
Married 0.05 6.02 –0.022 –2.67 –0.21 –2.37 
Log(P)     0.013 0.3 
Variance of error 
term 
0.3029 0.2755 0.2755 
No. of observations 5,448 5,074 5,074 




Table A.2.  Estimates of utility function parameters. Married couples, 1997. Box-Cox utility 
function.  
 Parameter Married couples 
 Estimate  SE 
Preferences:    
Consumption    
    Exponent 1α  0.6643 0.054 
    Scale 10−4 2α  1.8411 0.352 
    Subsistence  0C  40,000 N   
Female leisure    
    Exponent 3α  –0.8334 0.182 
    Constant 5α  11.8387 1.888 
    Log(age/10) 6α  –12.5285 1.945 
    Log(age/10) squared 7α  5.2456 0.733 
    No. children under or equal to 6 years 8α  0.9682 0.168 
    No. children over 6 years 9α  0.5075 0.094 
Male leisure    
    Exponent 4α  –1.8043 0.430 
    Constant 10α  3.8929 1.112 
    Log(age/10) 11α  –4.3054 1.142 
    Log(age/10) squared 12α  1.6682 0.444 
    No. children under or equal to 6 years 13α  0.0547 0.051 
    No. children over 6 years 14α  0.0083 0.029 
Leisure interaction 15α  0.2047 0.147 
    Leisure subsistence 0L  5,110  
The parameters Fθ ; 1 2log F F Ff f Sθ = +     
    Constant 1Ff  –3.5041 0.435 
    Education 2Ff  1.2389 0.366 
Opportunity density of hours offered    
    Male full-time peak  2.3769 0.086 
    Female full-time peak  1.4380 0.296 
    Male part-time peak  1.0960 0.063 
    Female part-time peak  0.5622 0.067 
Number of observations   2,511  
Log likelihood  –5,706.5  




A.2. Properties of the indirect utility function 
Given the distributional assumptions of the error terms the distribution of ( )max ( , )z B h z hε∈  can easily 





max ( , ) ( ( , ) ) ( ( , ) )
z B h
z B hz B h
P z h x P z h x P z h xε ε ε
∈
∈∈
  ≤ = ≤ = ≤       




exp( ) exp( ) exp( ( ) ).x x x
z B h
z B h
e e g h eθ− − −
∈
∈
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Accordingly, if we let ( )max ( , ) log( ( ))h z B h z h g hη ε θ∈= −  we obtain from the equation above that 
 
( )
( ) max ( , ) log( ( ) exp{ ( )exp( log( ( ))} exp( )xh z B hP x P z h x g h g h x g h eη ε θ θ θ
−
∈
 ≤ = ≤ + = − − − = − 
 
,  
which means that the error term hη  has the same distribution as ( , ).z hε  Moreover, hη  and kη  are 
independent due to the fact that the choice sets ( )B h  and ( )B k  contain different jobs and the error 
terms ( , )z hε  and ( , )z kε ′  are independent when .z z′≠  We can therefore write the conditional 
indirect utility function in (2.2a,b) as 
(A.8)  ( , ) log ( ( , ), ) log( ( )) hV h y u f hw y h g hµ θ η= + + +  
for h > 0 and  
(A.9)  (0, ) ( (0, ),0) (0).V y u f y ε= +  
A.3. Analytic formulae for the distribution of changes in welfare 
In the random utility framework, the model formulation implies that CV and EV become random 
variables, and in general no closed-form formulae for welfare effects exist. This subsection provides a 
short review of the approach introduced by Dagsvik and Karlström (2005), giving formulae for the 
distribution and moments for CV. Note that a procedure for obtaining the same characteristics for EV 
is for all practical purposes identical. The pre-reform values are represented by 0( , ),f y  with 1( , )f y  
denoting the post-reform structure. We now need to introduce observed individual characteristics into 
the notation. Specifically, let the subscript i index the individual and let iX  be a vector of observed 
individual characteristics of individual i. It follows from the definition above that iCV  is determined 
by 
(A.10)        0 1max ( ( ( , ), ) ) max ( ( ( , ) , , ) ).h D i i i ih h D i i i i ihu f w h y h,X u f w h y CV h Xη η∈ ∈+ = + +  
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A key assumption here is that the error terms do not change from the ex-ante to the post-reform situa-
tion. Recall that ( ( , ), )t i i i ihu f w h y h,X η+  is a conditional indirect utility function in the sense that it is 
the utility of the most preferred job within the latent choice set ( ).B h This means that our notion of 
compensating variation takes into account that the choices of the individual agents are constrained 
choices. Specifically, conditional on ,iX  CV is a random variable that in general depends on all sto-
chastic terms{ , }.ih h Dη ∈  This is because the maximum of the left-hand side of (A.3) is not neces-
sarily attained at the same discrete alternative as the maximum of the right-hand side of (A.3), except 
in special cases. Consequently, the random terms on each side do not cancel. Thus, the compensating 
measure defined above depends on the stochastic terms that represent unobserved preference heteroge-
neity as well as on ( )g hθ , which represents the value of the choice sets. We also assume that 
( ( , ) , )r i i iu f hw y x h,X+ = −∞  when 
1( , ) :i i ix a f hw y c≤ − =  where a is some suitable small number. 
This ensures that the utility of income less than some suitable value becomes very small. 
Let ihy  be the value that solves 
0 1( ( , ), ) ( ( , ) , ),i i i i ih iu f w h y h,X u f w h y y h,X= +  
0
ih  the ex-ante 
chosen hours of work and  
      0( , | ) ( , | ).i i i iK x h X P CV x h h X= > =   
In words, the latter expression is the joint probability that the compensating variation, given the initial 
utility level, is greater than some given real number x and the ex-ante chosen hours of work equals h. 
Dagsvik and Karlström (2005) demonstrate that the conditional distribution (1 minus the c.d.f.) of the 
expenditure function, given the individual characteristics, is given by  
(A.11)       
0
0 1
1{ max( , )}exp( ( ( , ), ))( , | )
exp(max( ( ( , ), , ), ( ( , ) , , ))
ih i i i
i
i i i i i iq D
x a y u f w h y h,XK x h X






where the notation  means that  if x is true and zero otherwise. The distribution of the 
expenditure function in Eq. (3.2) can be used to find the first and second order moments of CV 
conditional on .iX  The conditional expected value can be computed as  
(A.12)      ( | ) ( | )
i
i i i i i
c
E CV X P CV x X dx c
∞






c K x h X dx
∈
= +∑ ∫  
where ( )| 1.i i iP CV c X> =  Similarly, the conditional variance can be readily calculated. Standard 
numerical approaches can be applied to evaluate the indefinite integral in (A.12). Provided a 
representative micro-population S (say) is available, the corresponding unconditional expectation can 
be approximated by 
(A.13) 
1 ( | )i i i
i S
ECV E CV X
N ∈
≅ ∑   
1{ }x 1{ } 1x =
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where N is the micro-population size. We note that actual labour supply choices play no role in the 
calculation of the distribution function. Kornstad and Thoresen (2006) and Dagsvik, Locatelli, and 
Strøm (2009) apply this method to obtain the distribution of CV. 
A.4. McFadden’s simulation approach 
McFadden (1999) describes a practical procedure for obtaining average estimates of EV and CV, based 
on simulations. Here we demonstrate how measures of CV are obtained, but corresponding formulae 
can be derived for EV. The starting point for obtaining estimates of CV by the simulation approach of 
McFadden (1999) can be described as 
(A.14) 0 1max ( ( ( , ), ) ( )) max ( ( ( , ) , , ) ( ))k kh D i i i i h D i i i i iu f w h y h,X h u f w h y CV h X hη η∈ ∈+ = + + , 
for each random generated set, k , of standard Gumbel distributed error terms 
{ ( ), , , }.ki h h D i S k Mη ∈ ∈ ∈  At first glance it might seem to be numerically time-consuming to solve 
equation (A.14) directly, since it requires a maximisation algorithm. This may be so in the case where 
the random error terms are correlated, but not in our case where the error terms are independent. This 
means that a standard one-dimensional search algorithm can be applied.  
In practice, many sets of draws are obtained for the random part of the utility function. The 
corresponding CV is then calculated by solving (A.14) for each set of draws. From these data the 
simulated distribution of CV can be computed as well as the corresponding mean and variance. This 
can be done in two ways: one way is to compute the mean CV for each individual by taking the mean 
across all individual-specific simulations and subsequently calculating the empirical distributions of 
these individual-specific means. A second way is to calculate the distribution using all the simulated 
CV values directly. The interpretation of the latter approach is that it accounts for unobserved 
heterogeneity within observationally identical groups of individuals. 
 
